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REMEDIES AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONSUMER
CREDIT LAW
The strength of any regulatory legislation is best tested in the
character of its enforcement provisions and consumer credit legisla-
tion is no exception.' Many remedies provided by the Louisiana Con-
sumer Credit Law2 are found under various sections of the Act other
than those dealing with remedies and penalties' or administration.4
These remedies include limitations on negotiable instruments, 5 hold-
ers in due course,' the consumer's right to cancel home solicitation
sales' and a prohibition of unauthorized collection practices.'
The remedies and penalties section of the Consumer Credit Law
seeks to provide protection for an aggrieved consumer through a pro-
vision on unconscionablity9 and others providing for civil'0 and crimi-
nal" sanctions. Moreover, the administrative section of the Act estab-
lishes an office of commissioner 2 with various enumerated powers
including the power to sue for injunctive relief.'" The private civil
remedies section distinguishes between those violations of interest
1. Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25 Bus.
LAW. 511 (1970); Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039 (1968).
2. LA. R.S. 9:3510-68 (Supp. 1972).
3. Id. 9:3551-53 (Supp. 1972).
4. Id. 9:3554-56 (Supp. 1972).
5. Id. 9:3532 (Supp. 1972).
6. Id. 9:3533 (Supp. 1972).
7. Id. 9:3538 (Supp. 1972). The right to cancel a home solicitation is accompanied
by a provision requiring the vendor to notify the vendee of this right to cancel in the
sale. Id. 9:3539 (Supp. 1972). Upon exercising this right the vendee's down payment
is restored except for a limited cancellation fee. Id. 9:3540 (Supp. 1972).
8. Id. 9:3562 (Supp. 1972). This provision specifically preserves the right of the
debtor to bring tort actions under Civil Code article 2315.
9. See LA. R.S. 9:3551 (Supp. 1972).
10. LA. R.S. 9:3552 (Supp. 1972). It has been maintained that the aggrieved con-
sumer should be able to effectively seek redress: (1) As a matter of right through his
own counsel without having to seek the approval of a state agency, (2) Because private
enforcement capabilities would add thousands of additional persons as "private Attor-
neys General" to police the practices of the credit industry. Spanogle, Why Does the
Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW.
1039, 1040-41 (1968).
11. LA. R.S. 9:3553 (Supp. 1972).
12. Id. 9:3554 (Supp. 1972). Ideally, the commissioner is the state official whose
responsibility is to enforce the provisions of the Act. It has been maintained that the
consolidation of enforcement procedures into a single state office improves communi-
cation, uniformity and coordination of enforcement efforts. See Comment, 55 MINN.
L. REv. 572 (1971).
13. LA. R.S. 9:3555 (Supp. 1972).
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ceilings that are self-discovered 4 and those discovered through a writ-
ten consumer complaint. 5 If self-discovered, the creditor is given an
opportunity to correct the violation within fifteen days of the discov-
ery, or occurrence, without incurring civil liability." On the other
hand, violations discovered as a result of written consumer com-
plaints are categorized as either intentional or unintentional.,7 An
intentional violation occurs only if the consumer notifies the creditor
of the violation and the creditor fails to correct the violation within
30 days."6 The penalty for an intentional violation is a refund of all
loan finance or credit service charges plus recovery of three times the
amount of such charges in addition to reasonable attorney's fees."
If a creditor corrects the violation within the 30 day period, he
will incur no civil liability. 0 In such cases, the violation is considered
unintentional and the only remedy provided for such violation is its
correction.2 ' Thus, no matter how intentional a creditor's violation
may have been, he can escape liability simply by correcting the viola-
tion within 30 days of notice by the consumer.
These inadequate remedies are even further negated by the pre-
14. Id. 9:3552 B (Supp. 1972).
15. Id. 9:3352 A (Supp. 1972).
16. Id. 9:3552 B (Supp. 1972). These self-discovered violations by the creditor
exempt him from civil liability even if the violation was intentional. In the event of
self-discovered multiple violations, the creditor must notify the commissioner of their
existence within fifteen days of discovery, and must correct the violations as to each
consumer affected within 30 days, subject to two 30 day extensions to be granted at
the discretion of the commissioner.
17. Id. 9:3552 A (Supp. 1972).
18. R.S. 9:3552 provides in A(1)(a) that "the right to recover the civil penalty
under this subsection accrues only after
"(i) written notice is given to the extender of credit by certified mail addressed to the
extender of credit's place of business in which the consumer credit transaction arose;
"(ii) a copy of such notice is mailed to the extender of credit's agent for service of
process; and
"(iii) Thirty (30) days have elapsed since receipt of such notice by the extender of
credit, and the violation has not been corrected."
19. Id. 9:3552 A (Supp. 1972): The Uniform Consumer Credit Code provides for a
recovery of up to ten times the amount of the excess charge for deliberate violations.
(§ 5.202(4)). Thus, if the interest on an unpaid principal amount of $800 is 50 percent
($400) instead of the maximum 36 percent as provided for in R.S. 9:3519, ($800 at 36
percent is $288) under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code the maximum permissible
recovery (at the discretion of the court) would be the excess charge ($400 minus $288
equals $112) multiplied by ten which would be $1120 plus reasonable attorney's fees
(also allowable at the court's discretion). The Louisiana Consumer Credit Law pro-
vides for mandatory recovery of the entire service charge ($400) multiplied by three
which would be $1200 plus mandatory reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees.
20. LA. R.S. 9:3552 A (Supp. 1972). See note 18 supra.
21. Id.
CONSUMER PROTECTION
scriptive period imposed for civil actions under the section. An action
must be brought within 60 days of final payment of the contract or
within one year of the violation in a revolving loan or charge, ac-
count.2 2 A similar provision under the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code 2 has been criticized as being "ridiculously short ' ' 2 because
"many debtors do not realize that their rights have been abused until
long afterwards, [making] a long limitations period advisable." 5
In view of the remedial inadequacies found in the Act, it might
be advisable for a consumer, faced with loan finance charges exacted
in violation of the permissible maximum charges, 2 to rely upon the
Louisiana usury statute,2 not contained within the Act. This statute,
R.S. 9:3501, provides: "Any contract for the payment of interest in
excess of that authorized by law shall result in the forfeiture of the
entire interest so contracted." In Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge v.
Jones , 2 the Louisiana supreme court held
that the simple and unambiguous meaning of the statute is to
cause the forfeiture of all interest due on the contract, not just
the usurious portion of it and not just during the period that the
usurious charges were exacted.
2 9
Thus, R.S. 9:3501 provides for recovery of all interest when violations
occur, not just the overcharge upon correction following notification
provided under the Consumer Credit Law.
Thrift Funds concerned an agreement made prior to the Con-
sumer Credit Law. However, there is no reason to believe that R.S.
9:3501 has been repealed by the Act" as any such intention is not
evidenced in the Act's express repeal provisions.' Furthermore, there
is no substantial conflict between R.S. 9:3501 and the remedies and
penalties section dealing with written consumer complaints. Left
open is the question of whether a consumer could invoke the protec-
tion of R.S. 9:3501 upon receiving notification of a self-discovered
usurious violation by the creditor.
22. Id. 9:3552 E (Supp. 1972).
23. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.202(A).
24. Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. LAW. 511, 517-18 (1970).
25. Id. at 517.
26. LA. R.S. 9:3519 (Supp. 1972).
27. Id. 9:3501 (1950).
28. 274 So. 2d 150 (La. 1973).
29. Id. at 155.
30. La. Acts 1972, No. 454 § 1-15.
31. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-
Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231 (1974).
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The criminal penalties provided under the consumer law32 re-
quire proof that a creditor has "willfully" made excess charges. How-
ever, the scope of the term "willfully" and the burden of proof re-
quired are not stated. Furthermore, practical political considerations
make it doubtful that courts will ever define the term. It has been
suggested that "District Attorneys do not like to prosecute taxpaying,
politically aware businessmen over matters involving such technical
wrongs. "32
The Act provides for the office of an administrator. 4 The com-
missioner has the duty to counsel and to educate the consumer as well
as a duty to act upon consumer complaints. In order to perform these
duties, the commissioner has power to subpoena persons, to interpret
the act through guidelines, to revoke licenses of creditors and to bring
suits for an aggrieved consumer.35 An additional provision" gives the
commissioner authority to seek injunctive relief against creditors and
their agents to restrain present or future violations of the Act or other
fraudulent conduct.
The commissioner is expressly denied the authority to bring a
class action in behalf of consumers. 37 The need for such power is self-
evident. It would reduce multiplicity of suits, 8 make them economi-
cally efficient,3" and also provide a sufficient deterrent effect upon
creditors.'" According to the California supreme court
[a] class action by consumers produces . . . a therapeutic effect
upon those. . . who indulge in fraudulent practices, aid to legiti-
mate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate competition,
and avoidance to the judicial process of the burden of multiple
litigation involving identical claims . . .. ,
32. LA. R.S. 9:3553 (Supp. 1972).
33. Comment, 55 MINN. L. REV. 572 (1970).
34. LA. R.S. 9:3554 (Supp. 1972).
35. Id. The power to revoke licenses accrues only from the findings of an adminis-
trative hearing. Likewise, the commissioner may bring suit for an aggrieved consumer
only after an administrative hearing has been held and a finding is made that warrants
the commissioner's taking action. Thus, the consumer must bear the burden of the
time and expense of administrative procedure merely to get the commissioner to take
his cause to court.
36. LA. R.S. 9:3555 (Supp. 1972).
37. Id. 9:3554 F (Supp. 1972).
38. Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. LAW. 511, 518 (1970).
39. Comment, 55 MINN. L. REV. 572, 596 (1971).
40. Id.
41. Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796, 800-01 (1971).
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Despite the prohibition of class actions, the other duties and
powers of the commissioner appear to be significant. Whether these
powers can ever be aggressively and effectively used on behalf of the
consumer remains to be seen. It is generally agreed that the remedial
emphasis on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is upon enforcement
through a public agency," as is present in the Louisiana act. This
approach emphasizes the prevention of violations before they occur
rather than in remedying them after they occur. 3 The consolidation
of efforts within a single office to deal with consumer problems is also
advanced in favor of the agency approach." However, it has been
maintained that this emphasis upon administrative powers for reme-
dial action make regulatory provisions a "loosely enforced mockery ' 4 5
because "the finance lobby can play buddies with the administrator
. . . or can cut his appropriations"" by exertion of influence upon the
governor, legislators or other state officials."
On the other hand, it is doubtful that the private remedies and
penalties of the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law will serve as a deter-
rent to the abuses by creditors. The civil remedies are substantially
less than those already in existence. Thus, the consumer receives
little with regards to an affirmative vindication of his rights. Litiga-
tion is an extremely uncertain process which carries no guarantee of
success, requiring the consumer to invest time, money and his reputa-
tion and good will with the credit industry." This is especially hard
felt by the low-income and under-educated who suffer an additional
burden of high interest rates in the credit market place.49 As a result
of a failure to offer adequate prospects of success or to substantially
compensate him for his risks upon successful litigation, the consumer
is unlikely to litigate on his own. Thus, the nature of the protection
to the consumer found in the Act is greatly diminished by the lack
of private preventive and remedial opportunities.
W. Richard House, Jr.
42. Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. LAW 511 (1970); Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039 (1968); Comment, 55 MINN.
L. REv. 572 (1971).
43. Comment, 55 MINN. L. REV. 572, 585 (1971).
44. Id. at 586.
45. Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. LAW. 511 (1970).
46. Id. at 513.
47. Id. at 518.
48. Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew
Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039, 1042-43 (1968).
49. Jones, The Inner City Marketplace: The Need for Law and Order, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1013 (1969).
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